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Abstract 
In the post-9/11 context, security issues have become increasingly central to the hosting of sport 
mega-event (SMEs). Security budgets for events like the Olympic Games now run into billions 
of dollars. This article seeks to advance the emerging field of SME security research in 
substantive and analytical terms. We identify three sets of issues and problems that are taking 
shape within this field: first, comparative issues in relationship to the Global North and Global 
South, notably given the growing number of SMEs set to be staged in the Global South; second, 
various risks and security strategies that are specific to different SMEs, including perceived 
terrorist threats, spectator violence, and broader risks associated with poverty, social divisions, 
and urban crime; and third, the security legacies that follow from SMEs, such as new surveillance 
technologies, new security-focused social policies, and security-influenced urban redevelopment. 
We argue that future research into SME security governance should be underpinned by a 
synthetic theoretical framework. This framework brings together three particular strands: first, a 
sociological approach that explores the “security field,” drawing in part on Bourdieu; second, 
critical urban geographical theory, which contextualizes security strategies in relationship to new 
architectures of social control and consumption in urban settings; and third, different strands of 
risk theory, notably in regard to reflexive modernization, governmentality, and cultural 
sociological questions. 
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Introduction 
In the past two decades, sport mega-event (SMEs) have become global occasions of enormous 
economic, political, and social importance. SMEs such as the Olympic Games or football’s 
World Cup finals are global spectacles that, for host nations, impact directly on urban 
regeneration (Burbank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2002), tourism (Degen, 2004; Euchner, 1999), 
and international standing (Ahlert, 2006). For example, the 2006 World Cup finals in Germany 
are estimated to have generated, for the host nation, the following: 5 million international visitors; 
 18 million entrants to city “fan festivals”; a combined global television audience of 26 billion; 
and a national economic boost of US$12.5 billion (see The Independent, March 1, 2007; Infront Sport, 
February 6, 2007; Associated Content, July 26, 2006). In tandem, a wide variety of social scientific 
research has emerged over the past 10 to 15 years, to examine both the general aspects of SMEs 
and more specific issues of urban development and civic/national “branding” (see, for example, 
Hall, 2006; Miller, 2000; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2006), social and cultural politics (see, for 
example, Close, Askew, & Xin, 2006; Marivoet, 2006; Roche, 2000, 2003; Whitson & Horne, 
2006), and sport-related violence (see, for example, Stott, Hutchison, & Drury, 2001). 
Arguably, over the last decade, and certainly since the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent“war on 
terror,” the strongest realm of SME expansion, in terms of cost and personnel, has centered on 
security and risk management. In terms of costs, for example, Olympic security bills in the pre-
9/11 context rose steadily from the 1992 Barcelona Games (US$66.2 million) through Atlanta 
1996 (US$108.2 million) and then Sydney 2000 (US$179.6 million). The post-9/11 security costs 
subsequently ballooned, through Athens 2004 (US$1.5 billion), the Turin Winter Olympics in 
2006 (US$1.4 billion), and the exceptional case of Beijing 2008 (US$6.5 billion); despite the 2007-
2009 credit crunch, the security budget of London 2012 (at around US$2.2 billion) is certain to 
escalate (see Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2004; Foreign Policy, July 2008; Daily Telegraph, 
December 11, 2007). In terms of personnel, Sydney 2000 had set a new security mark by 
mobilizing almost 5,000 police officers and up to 7,000 contract and volunteer security officials 
specifically for the event (Lenskyj, 2002, p. 47). The 2008 Beijing Games—with an estimated 
110,000 security personnel, targeted in part at intensive suppression of public protests—are 
unlikely to be matched in the near future. Yet elsewhere, the London Met Police have asked to 
treble their numbers through hiring 6,000-7,000 more officers specifically for the 2012 Olympics, 
whereas thousands more contract security agents will also be operational (Sunday Times, June 1, 
2008). In addition, the 2010 FIFA World Cup finals in South Africa will see more than 40,000 
police officers, up to 50,000 reservists, and thousands more security agents all allocated event-
focused duties (The Star, March 28, 2007). 
These figures for costs and personnel confirm the relevance of SME security for investigation by 
social scientists. In recent years, an emerging field of SME security research has begun to take 
shape, primarily in investigating individual events from the specific disciplinary perspectives of 
human geography/urban studies, political science, or sociology (see, for example, Boyle & 
Haggerty, 2009; Floridis, 2004; Klauser, 2008a, 2008b; Samatas, 2007; Tulloch, 2000). In this 
brief article, we seek to advance this emergent research field in substantive and analytical terms. 
 First, we examine some of the emerging issues and problems that surround the question of the 
securitization of future SMEs. Second, we argue that future research should actively explore new 
forms of interdisciplinary investigation, notably by integrating the epistemological and 
methodological insights of sociology and urban studies. In broad terms, these arguments set out 
a research agenda for the social scientific investigation of future SMEs. 
Emerging Issues and Problems in Sport Mega-event Research 
There are three sets of emerging issues and problems which we discuss here in regard to SMEs: 
first, the growing number of SMEs in the Global South relative to the Global North; second, 
event-specific risks and strategies that require investigation; and third, the “security legacies” that 
follow from SMEs. 
SMEs in the Global North and Global South 
Throughout the 20th century, there were always opportunities for the largest sport events to be 
hosted by developing or industrializing societies, including nations located in what we now term 
the Global South. The Olympic Games were staged in the capital cities of Asian societies seeking 
to establish themselves within international marketplaces (Tokyo in 1964, Seoul in 1988). Latin 
America too has hosted one summer Olympics (Mexico 1968), and several football World Cup 
finals, including the inaugural tournament (Uruguay 1930, Brazil 1950, Chile 1962, Mexico 1968 
and 1986, and Argentina 1978). 
However, since the early 1980s, the context for hosting these events has been radically 
transformed in two particular ways. First, sports tournaments themselves have expanded into 
truly global mega-event with associated commercial and cultural significance; since 9/11, these 
events have security budgets and agendas that reflect this transnational significance. Second, 
beyond sport, global political and economic transformations have occurred, notably resulting in 
the intensified urbanization, industrialization, and transnational connectivity of many developing 
nations. 
Within this new context, and following on from the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, several SMEs will 
take place in emerging nations in the Global South. In football, the 32-nation, 1-month-long 
World Cup finals will be hosted by South Africa in 2010 and Brazil in 2014. In 2010, New Delhi 
will host South Asia’s biggest-ever multisport SME, the 85-nation Commonwealth Games. The 
hosting of these 21st century SMEs in the Global South will bring international sports and 
 securitization into completely new territory. For social scientists, these SMEs also promise new 
fields for critical investigation. 
In the context of this article, three security-related issues centre on these SMEs. First, research 
needs to examine the specific perceived “security risks” at SMEs in the Global South. Second, 
research needs to explore the international security-related transfers that occur between the 
Global North and Global South, in relationship to knowledge, technology, and capital. Third, 
research needs to explore how we may develop a detailed comparative analysis of security-related 
issues and processes at SMEs in the Global North and Global South. 
Event-Specific Risks and Security Strategies 
It is possible to break event-specific risks and security strategies into three general categories, and 
these centre on (a) terrorist risks, (b) spectator and political violence, and (3) poverty, social 
divisions, and urban crime. Importantly, these security risks differ not only in their main causes, 
forms, and effects but also in their symbolism and indirect consequences. Threats of terrorism 
and political violence, for example, are often not only seen as to endanger the athletes, spectators, 
and local population but also as a symbolic and political embarrassment—and hence financial 
risk—for host nations and organizing institutions. To understand the scope and importance of 
security strategies at SMEs, both physical and symbolic dimensions of event-specific risks have 
to be taken into account. At this place, however, it is not possible to give an exhaustive 
interpretation of the complex and interacting modalities, causes, and effects of the whole 
panoply of physical and symbolic risks at SMEs; that will be the subject of separate work. 
First, perceived terrorist risks connected to regional/global politics have become major SME security 
issues in both the Global North and Global South. As a consequence, for example, the largest 
security operation in Canadian history will be in action during the Vancouver Winter Olympics 
in 2010 with the mobilization of thousands of military personnel and equipment. For the South 
Africa World Cup finals, security measures will include manned aircraft and bomb-squad tools 
and experts. 
For some analysts, these kinds of security strategies in regard to terrorist risk may be more widely 
contextualized in relationship to the rise of “military urbanism,” which describes the spread of 
militarized definitions and organization of urban space, particularly in the context of the war on 
terror (Coaffee & Wood, 2006; Eick, Sambale, & Töpfer, 2008; Graham, 2006, 2007, 2009). 
Major league sports in the United States have had close experience of this process, notably 
 through meetings with “Homeland Security” chiefs and the subsequent introduction of intensive 
security measures at SMEs such as the Super Bowl (Schimmel, 2006, pp. 169-170). 
Second, spectator-related violence will continue to be a major security focus at future SMEs, 
primarily in football contexts. In terms of direct social control measures, major European 
football SMEs in recent years have been intensively policed, with the commingling of rival fans 
being closely monitored by officers and surveillance systems, whereas widespread travel bans 
have been imposed by some nations (for example, more than 3,000 English fans were prevented 
from traveling to the 2006 World Cup finals in Germany).1 
An additional security issue at recent tournaments has centered on the hundreds of thousands of 
ticketless fans who congregate in cities that are hosting major fixtures. At the 2006 World Cup 
finals and at Euro 2008 (in Austria and Switzerland), the host nations established public “fan 
zones” where supporters of different nations could drink, party, and watch fixtures on giant 
television screens. Fan zones may be seen as a public-centered response by host nations to the 
social exclusion caused by the commodification of football in general and by how the game’s 
authorities and the black market conspire to distribute tickets in particular. However, the Fan 
zones are themselves subject to intensive monitoring by security agencies and allow for the 
commercialization of particular spaces through corporate sponsorships and private VIP sections 
(Hagemann, 2008; Klauser, 2008a). 
Third, the interconnected themes of poverty, deep social divisions, and urban crime will continue 
to be relevant issues in regard to SMEs in the Global North. For example, the London Borough 
of Newham, where the Olympic Stadium is being built, is one of the United Kingdom’s most 
deprived and ethnically diverse areas; in Vancouver, the Downtown Eastside, location of several 
event venues for the 2010 Winter Games, has high levels of street crime, drug use, and 
homelessness (Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter 
Games, 2007, p. 134). 
In the Global South, however, these intersecting themes acquire a categorically different scale of 
significance. In South Africa, for example, intense “racial” divisions continue to bedevil lives and 
livelihoods: almost 50% of people live in poverty, unemployment is estimated at 26% to 40%, 
and around 5.6 million are HIV+; these figures apply essentially to the Black South African 
population. South Africa also has global high records for violent crime, notably rape, hijacking, 
murder, and robbery; and anti-immigrant riots erupted across the major townships in May 2005. 
Thus, in preparation for the 2010 World Cup finals, strong security concerns will focus on 
 controlling relationships between wealthy international visitors and local populations in urban 
centers and in “fan parks” where fixtures will be screened on giant television screens. 
In the context of this article, therefore, research needs to explore the intersections of these three 
security dimensions. As more SMEs are hosted in the Global South, the focus on poverty, social 
divisions, and urban crime will certainly become far more prominent. However, research also 
needs to explore how these event-specific “risks,” and the subsequent strategies of securitization, 
interrelate with wider processes of commodification and privatization within urban and national 
contexts. 
The Security Legacy of SMEs 
A major discourse advanced by bidding committees and governments which are seeking to host 
SMEs concerns the civic and national “legacies” that will remain long after these brief sporting 
extravaganzas have left town. Most discussions of SME legacies centre on the economy (such as 
jobs, businesses, global advertising), infrastructure (such as improved transport routes, 
regeneration of inner cities), new sports facilities, and increased public participation in sport. 
However, little debate has been directed toward what we term here the security legacy of SMEs. By 
security legacy, we are referring to a range of security-related strategies and impacts which 
continue to have significance beyond the life of the sport event. Here, we identify six kinds of 
security legacy associated with SMEs: 
1. Security technologies that are piloted or implemented for the SMEs—for example, new CCTV or 
other surveillance systems in major urban centers; 
2. New security practices which are deployed during the SME and then extended into other social 
fields—for example, the widespread use of contracted security officials to police the SME or 
involvement in partnership relationships with other national police forces or security companies; 
3. Governmental policies and new legislation which are introduced to enhance SME security resilience 
and remain in force afterward—for example, new laws that restrict public association or the 
movement of specific individuals; 
4. Externally imposed social transformations that have at least in part a security focus and which take 
hold before and after the SME—for example, the clearing of specific“undesirable” or “unloved” 
populations from SME spaces; 
 5. Generalized changes in social and transsocietal relationships following SME securitization—for 
example, different relationships between local communities and police officials following 
particular incidents or security strategies at the SME; and 
6. Urban redevelopment which has connections or consequences for SME securitization—for 
example, slum clearance and rebuilding programs that are intended in part to repopulate and 
commodify specific inner-city localities. 
In recent years, the first category—involving new technologies—has provided the most obvious 
security legacy for SMEs, notably in the case of CCTV. However, we find that all of these 
security legacies tend to come into play at individual SMEs. 
For example, to pick the most striking recent case, for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
1. most money from the security budget was spent on new technologies, particularly extensive 
CCTV and other monitoring systems that have remained in place after the event (New York Times, 
August 4, 2008); 
2. new security practices are evidenced in the business relationships that have developed between the 
Chinese government and major U.S. security and information corporations, enabling the 
Olympic hosts to acquire high-tech surveillance systems and associated expertise—relevant U.S. 
corporations include GE, Honeywell, IBM, and United Technologies (New York Times, 
December 28, 2007); 
3. it would be difficult for Chinese governmental policies to restrict further its already tight hold on 
major political rights, such as freedom of speech. The government sought to deflect international 
criticism of its human rights record by pointing to the establishment of “protest zones” during 
the Olympics; however, protestors were required to take serious personal risks by applying in 
advance for the right to protest. The Chinese government did, however, introduce tighter visa 
restrictions prior to the Olympics, and some of these are expected to remain in place; 
4. in advance of the Olympics, Beijing police initiated crackdowns on indigenous ethnic 
minorities, particularly Muslim peoples such as the Uighurs from far-west China. As a result of 
this harassment, many of these minorities left Beijing to return to their homelands and may not 
return (New York Times, August 14, 2008); 
5. in advance of the Olympics, Beijing underwent an estimated US$40 billion redevelopment 
program. Up to 1.5 million people were forced to move, as homes were razed in neighborhoods 
redeveloped into new commercial zones. Former residents have seen their public protests against 
 displacement and low levels of compensation broken up by police officers or local 
“neighborhood committees” (CBS, August 4, 2008); 
6. changes in social relationships between local communities and police officers will inevitably follow 
from relocation, redevelopment, and the installation of new security systems. 
It would be wrong, of course, to assume that SMEs in the West or other global regions do not 
generate their own distinctive security legacies. In Europe, in terms of new technology, in late 
2006, the United Kingdom was estimated to have around 20% (or 4.2 million) of the world’s 
total number of CCTV cameras, and London already has the world’s highest number of cameras 
per capita. Sport was the catalyst for this extraordinary diffusion of surveillance systems; by the 
early 1990s, all major UK football stadiums had installed CCTV systems, and the successfully 
piloted technology was subsequently rolled out to most major urban centers (Giulianotti & 
Armstrong, 1998). The 2012 Olympics will see further security legacies in technological terms, 
including microphones attached to CCTV cameras and a massive extension of the national DNA 
database. At the 2006 World Cup finals in Germany, the host nation temporarily “privatized” 
public spaces in which fans would gather, thereby enabling more intensive forms of surveillance 
to be imposed by contracted companies than would otherwise be permitted for use by police 
forces (Eick & Töpfer, 2008).2 
In Australia, prior to the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the government passed legislation to intensify 
controls and prohibitions on public gatherings at various sites across the host city; the new 
regulations were only subject to review in 2004 (Lenskyj, 2002, pp. 55-56). In 1982, as part of the 
build-up to the Commonwealth Games, the Queensland Premier, Joh Bjelke-Peterson, had 
introduced draconian laws primarily to prevent demonstrations by indigenous peoples during the 
SME. The legislation, which banned assemblies of more than three people throughout the state, 
and resulted in hundreds of indigenous Australians being arrested, was only repealed in full in 
1991 (Foley, 2008, p. 127). 
In the United States, the Super Bowl’s host cities have sought to squeeze out marginalized 
groups from festivities, including designated entertainment zones. Around 100 security agencies 
were in action for the 2006 event in Detroit, with homeless people warned by local officers to 
stay away from the different event venues (Michigan Daily, February 1, 2006; Seattle Times, January 
26, 2006). 
In South Africa, the security legacies of imposed social transformations, generalized changes in 
social relationships, and urban redevelopment are all set to come together before and beyond the 
 2010 World Cup finals. Local and national authorities argue that SME-driven urban 
redevelopment will facilitate the construction of safer“world-class” cities, but such advances may 
well come at the expense of the urban poor. For example, in the run-up to the World Cup draw 
in Durban, street children were rounded up and arrested by police (Daily News, November 22, 
2007). In 2006, the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Johannesburg City council, which 
sought to evict 300 squatters from inner-city buildings on the grounds of safety and health. The 
court ruling left tens of thousands of poor inner-city South Africans liable to systematic “social 
cleansing” strategies. Eviction orders founded on Apartheid-era laws were forcibly served on 
thousands of residents, sparking strong NGO criticism and resistant riots (The Independent, July 30, 
2005; IRIN, April 16, 2007). 
Similar strategies of eviction and exclusion have been evidenced in New Delhi. By late 2006, as 
part of the build-up to the 2010 Commonwealth Games, more than 250,000 people had their 
slum housing demolished to enable redevelopment work along the banks of the Yamuna (see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5325034.stm). The city authorities also began to 
clear thousands of beggars and stray animals from the city’s streets in a move described by one 
human rights lawyer as a “criminalization of poverty” (Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 2008). 
Overall, SME security legacies appear to be increasingly substantial and far reaching. Again, 
research in this field needs to explore in diachronic terms how specific security legacies (such as 
high-tech surveillance systems, changes in legislation) are established in particular contexts. 
Research also is required to explore comparatively the SME security legacies in different contexts. 
And third, research is required to explore how these SME security legacies connect to other 
processes of commodification and privatization within urban and national contexts. 
Toward a Synthetic Theoretical Framework for Researching SME Security Governance 
In general terms, for social scientists, the contemporary security processes at SMEs have very 
strong social, political, and geographical dimensions, as reflected through social relationships, the 
everyday politics of the “war on terror,” and urban redevelopment. It is therefore reasonable to 
argue that future social scientific investigations of SMEs securitization should seek to engage and 
to integrate academic disciplines that seek to account most fully for these processes. We are 
thinking here in particular of sociology (including its hyphenated offspring, notably political 
sociology and the sociology of sport) and human geography (most obviously, its own 
subdisciplines of political geography and urban studies). In recent times, the field of urban 
studies has generated the most conceptually advanced and empirically informed investigations of 
 SME securitization. However, these studies would benefit from a full utilization of sociological 
theory and methods, as hitherto the social dimensions of SME securitization have been rather 
underplayed. 
We would argue here that the analytical frameworks for future research into SME securitization 
should bring together three specific strands. First, the sociological component should enable 
researchers to theorize SME securitization as a socially contested domain. We may therefore 
develop the concept of the security field, as derived particularly from the sociology of Bourdieu 
(1990, 1993, pp. 72-76; see Wacquant, 1989), and as adapted and extended by Crossley (2002, p. 
674). The concept of the security field refers to a specific, security-defined social space, which 
contains objective, game-like relationships that are played out between various “players” (or 
stakeholders). Each player has different volumes and kinds of “capital” or power within the field. 
Stakeholders within the security field may include local people and residents, visiting spectators, 
police officers, government officials, local authority officials, local business people, 
nongovernmental and community-based organizations, sports officials, national and local 
politicians, private security companies, journalists, and other commentators. 
Second, research into SMEs should use critical urban geographical theory to analyse the relationship 
of event securitization to the general social control and transformation of public spaces (Coaffee 
& Wood, 2006). This form of theoretical framework allows research to concentrate on how 
security resilience at SMEs connects variously to broader militaristic influences on public 
geography in the war on terror and to sociospatial techniques for segregating and controlling 
populations. Critical urban theory also enables analysis to concentrate on how generalized 
sociospatial control of the SME connects to the contemporary fashioning of a neoliberal, 
revanchist city (MacLeod, 2002; Smith, 1996). 
Third, the broad social scientific field of risk theory should be fully mined to examine SME 
securitization qua “risk management.” Risk theory in this regard helps to clarify and to explicate a 
wide range of social processes associated with SME securitization: for example, how specific 
security risks and “risk groups” are identified by relevant stakeholders at different SMEs; how 
security institutions (both public and private) implement specific risk-management techniques 
within particular contexts; and how risk legacies remain in post-SME contexts. Risk theories help 
to contextualize empirical findings in regard to broad structural processes and transformations. 
Relevant risk theories here would include the concept of “reflexive modernization” (Beck, 1992; 
Lash, Szerszynski, & Wynne, 1996), Foucauldian thinking regarding new forms of 
 “governmentality” for shaping public actions (O’Malley, 2004), and new perceptions or cultural 
senses of risk within late-modern societies (Boyne, 2003; Lupton, 1999; Slovic, 2000; Tulloch, 
2006). 
In broad terms, the three conceptual frameworks—security field, critical urban geographical 
theory, and risk theories—are complementary and allow for a broad range of social scientific 
issues and problems surrounding SME security to be investigated and analyzed. These 
conceptual frameworks, when integrated, are particularly conducive to an inductive and largely 
qualitative methodological strategy. 
Concluding Comments 
SMEs have entered a new phase of development and growth, and their securitization provides 
perhaps the most striking illustration of that transformation. SME security, in itself, is a complex 
assemblage of social control mechanisms that is undergoing profound change, notably in terms 
of costs, personnel, the rising influence of private security, the perceived dangers of terrorism, 
and the focus on indigenous crime. The wider consequences of SME securitization are being 
manifested in evermore significant ways, particularly in the form of security legacies that include 
new public surveillance systems, changes in social relationships (notably in communities where 
major venues are located), urban regeneration, and the commodification and privatization of 
public spaces. 
The research agenda that we have set out here is underpinned by the commitment to investigate 
critically both the specific properties and diverse effects of SME securitization. This field of 
research requires a transnational focus, assembling case-studies of single SMEs to provide 
sustained, comparative studies of security issues, and processes at different events within varying 
contexts. Given the prior role of sport as a “laboratory” for piloting future public security 
systems, this research should also illuminate the ways in which new forms of securitization are 
likely to be manifested across the wider public spheres in both the Global North and Global 
South. Finally, the type of research agenda that is set out here is interdisciplinary in the full sense 
of the word, by integrating the cognate disciplines of sociology and human geography/urban 
studies, with the transdiciplinary field of “risk studies” providing further cohesive benefits. As 
such, this research agenda has the capacity to advance the academic field, by demonstrating the 
possibilities of full interdisciplinary collaboration between sociology and human geography. 
Notes 
                                             
1 As an intermediary category between terrorism and spectator violence, political crowd violence 
is often portrayed as a major security concern for host nations, from violent neo-Nazi 
demonstrations at the 2006 World Cup finals to minority protests at the Beijing Olympics. 
2 New types of relationship are also developing between SME hosts and international police 
forces, particularly in regard to the transfer of security knowledge and expertise (cf. Klauser, 
2008b). For example, at the 2010 World Cup finals in South Africa, foreign police officers in 
national uniforms will be on patrol (The Star, March 28, 2007). 
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